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Abstract 
Clinical practice guidelines are used increasingly across medical specialties and settings, making evaluation of their utility 
and validity a critical public health issue. In this paper, we describe some of the challenges that specialty organizations face 
as they try to ensure that their guidelines are trustworthy and useful. We examine the practice guidelines for Major 
Depressive Disorder recently published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA), identify five sources of potential 
bias that may affect the guideline development process and offer suggestions based on our review. For example, even for 
mild depression, this guideline privileges pharmacotherapy over other interventions, despite questions about the risk/benefit 
ratio and the increasing concern over the iatrogenic harms of SSRIs and SNRIs.  We compare recommendations from 
international scientific groups (e.g. NICE) with those produced by specialty societies in an effort to demonstrate some of the 
ways in which conflicts of interest, both intellectual and financial, may unduly influence guidelines. 
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Clinical practice guidelines (CPGs), designed to improve 
healthcare outcomes, have been criticized for not 
producing their intended result because of overly formulaic 
care [1], wide variations in guideline quality [2] and 
because they discourage concordance [3] and patient 
insight [4]. Moreover, when ‘mono-disciplinary 
specialists’ [5] develop CPGs, there is the risk that the 
recommended courses of action may unduly reflect the 
vested interests of the specialty groups that produce the 
guidelines. Added to this bias are the financial conflicts of 
interests, either of individual guideline authors or the 
specialty society itself. Concerns about CPGs becoming 
“marketing and opinion-based pieces” [6] have escalated 
and in March of this year, the U.S. Institute of Medicine 
(IoM) issued a report, “Standards for Developing 
Trustworthy CPGs” [7]. There are numerous examples of 
specialty groups producing guidelines that do not support, 
or even contradict, recommendations made by disinterested 
parties (see Table 1). 
In this article, we describe some of the challenges 
specialty organizations face as they try to assure their final 
product is balanced and accurate, citing some examples 
(see Table 1). For further illustration, we also explore, in 
depth, the practice guideline for Major Depressive 
Disorder (MDD) recently published by the American 
Psychiatric Association (APA) [17]. We have selected this 
guideline for review because it is a prominent and trusted 
resource in the U.S. and because its focus on the primacy 
of pharmacotherapy differs from guidelines in other 
countries (e.g. Canada and the UK).  We make five 
observations and offer suggestions based on our review. 
 
 
Intellectual Conflict of Interest - 
Challenge 1: Content Over Process 
 
Guideline development groups (GDG) without 
methodologists involved may be more likely to accept 
research results at face value, especially if the results 
confirm current beliefs [18]. Being a researcher does not 
necessarily mean that one is trained in clinical 
epidemiology and has expertise in interpreting evidence 
from randomized controlled trials (RCTs) [19]. For 
example,  developers  of  the  APA  guideline  consider  all  
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Table 1. Examples of Conflicting Guidelines 
 
Topic Conclusion from a scientific 
group without self-interest 
Conclusion from a professional 
society 
Reflected conflict of interest 
Treatment of patients 
with diabetes 
 
Insulin glargine does not offer any 
benefit over less expensive insulin 
products and should not be 
included on provincial formularies 
[8].  
Brand name-only Insulin glargine 
should be used as an alternative 
for generic long-insulin [9].  
Possible financial conflict of 
interest of the individual guideline 
writers or the specialty society.* 




Screening and treatment should 
not be routinely performed [10].  
 
 
Screening and treatment should 
routinely be performed: “Although 
good evidence is unavailable [to 
support our recommendation], 
there is a sizable amount of fair 
evidence and an abundance of 
opinion by experts . . . The 
[scientific panel recommendations] 
are contrary to the practice of 
many. . . experts” [11]. 
Intellectual conflict of interest 
(confirmation bias) and the duty of 
the professional society to 





“The U.S. Preventive Services 
Task Force (USPSTF) concludes 
that the evidence is insufficient to 
recommend screening infants for 
hyperbilirubinemia to prevent 
chronic bilirubin encephalopathy” 
[12]. 
 
“We recommend universal 
predischarge bilirubin screening. . 
., which helps to assess the risk of 
subsequent severe 
hyperbilirubinemia” [13].  
 
Intellectual conflict of interest 
(confirmation bias) and the duty of 
the professional society to 
represent the best interests of its 
members. 
Breast cancer 
screening in women 
less than 50 years old 
The USPSTF recommends against 
routinely performing screening 
mammography. There is at least 
moderate certainty that the net 
benefit is small [14].  
Annual screening beginning at age 
40 for all women, at age 30 for 
women at high risk [15].  
Intellectual conflict of interest 
(confirmation bias) and the duty of 
the professional society to 





 “Do not use antidepressants 
routinely to treat persistent 
subthreshold depressive 
symptoms or mild depression 
because the risk-benefit ratio is 
poor” [16]. 
Antidepressants are a first line 
treatment for patients with mild to 
moderate depression [17]. 
Intellectual conflict of interest 
(confirmation bias) and the duty of 
the professional society to 
represent the best interests of its 
members. Possible financial 
conflict of interest of the individual 
guideline writers or the specialty 
society. 
* The manufacturer of the product is a corporate partner and contributor of the CDA and almost all of the guideline developers have a 
financial relationship with the manufacturer. 
 
 
double-blind RCTs to be Level A evidence [17, p.103] and 
do not address methodological issues such as duration, 
study conduct or end-points (e.g. remission versus 
reduction in symptoms) that can affect the quality of the 
study.   
Methodological experts are essential to a GDG 
because they are better equipped than content experts or 
researchers to address critical methodological issues and 
questions that arise [20]. Given that the internal and 
external validity of clinical research is quite variable and 
dependent on a number of factors, uncritically accepting 
meta-analyses and double-blind randomized controlled 
trials is not a method for assuring an adequate evidence 
base [21-23].  Approximately 75% of clinical trials 
published in major journals are industry funded [24]. 
Given that the odds are 5.3 times greater than 
commercially funded studies will support their sponsors’ 
products than non-commercially funded investigations, 
study results should not be accepted at face value [21, 
p.921].   
For example, one of the most commonly applied 
intent-to-treat models - last observation carried forward 
(LOCF) - can artificially bias results in favor of the study 
drug [25,26]. This model assumes a randomization of 
drop-outs that is not supported by any theory or data 
[27,28] and it is also a model that fails to assess differences 
in outcomes in patients who keep taking the drug [29]. The 
high drop-out rates for participants enrolled in 
psychotropic drug trials is a pernicious problem; average 
drop-out rates of 50-64% have been reported in 
antipsychotic studies and 37% in antidepressant (AD) 
studies [28]. Thus, the appropriateness of using LOCF and 
other analytic techniques to control for attrition is an 
important methodological issue that deserves attention by 
guideline developers when making recommendations about 
efficacy of ADs. For example, Dubovsky and Dubovsky 
[29] make a critical point that is not addressed in this 
guideline: in many comparator trials, Selective Serotonin 
Re-uptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) appeared to be at least as 
effective as tricyclic ADs (TCAs). However, “because 
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some TCAs such as imipramine are not as well tolerated 
and more likely to be discontinued early, . . . for more 
severely depressed patients who are more motivated to 
continue it until it works, imipramine may be more helpful. 
(Use of LOCF) misses the impact of adherence to 
treatment” (italicization ours) [29, p.51]. 
All guideline development groups should include 
content experts, but when specialty societies produce 
CPGs, the majority of the panel should be composed of 
individuals independent of the specialty group who have 
expertise in methodology and epidemiology [30-32]. For 
example, Germany’s approach to depression guideline 
development began with the critical appraisal of 
international guidelines for depression conducted by 
multidisciplinary focus groups of experts in evidence-
based medicine (EBM). 
 
 
Intellectual Conflict of Interest - 
Challenge 2: Confirmation Bias 
 
A particular challenge in the guideline development 
process is how to include, in the most accurate and 
balanced way, the results of one’s own research. That is, 
when a researcher designed, analyzed, or interpreted the 
results of an RCT or meta-analysis he may have an implicit 
bias toward the study and may not be as open to 
considering questions about the study’s quality [33].   
All members of the APA guideline committee are also 
active researchers in major depressive disorder. The IoM 
recommends that researchers and writers of systematic 
reviews should not formulate guidelines [34-36]. The UK 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) allows researchers to participate in guideline 
development, but further stipulates that, “understanding of 
evidence-based medicine is essential” [16]. In keeping 
with the IoM and NICE’s suggestions, in those instances 
where a conflict is unavoidable and the expertise is 
essential, individuals should recuse themselves when 




Intellectual Conflict of Interest - 
Challenge 3: Acknowledging and 
Addressing Controversies 
 
Controversies or limitations to the available evidence 
should be clearly outlined or reflected in guidelines. For 
example, in the APA guideline, the iatrogenic harms of 
pharmacologic treatment and the documented lack of 
efficacy for patients with mild to moderate depression [37-
39] are not reflected fully in the weighing and 
interpretation of evidence. There exists controversy about 
the risk/benefit ratio of prescribing ADs as a first-line 
intervention for mild to moderate depression [16,37,38,40], 
especially when it is a first episode. The controversy is due 
to the increasing documentation of and concern about 
adverse side effects [c.f. 41] and because most RCTs were 
not adequately powered to address questions of efficacy of 
AD use for mild depression [37, p.48]. Two well-
publicized meta-analyses independently concluded that 
because of a lack of efficacy, AD medication should not be 
the first line intervention for mild to moderate depression 
[37,38]. In light of these results, “efforts should be made to 
clarify to prospective clinicians and prospective patients 
that . . . there is little evidence to suggest that . . . 
(antidepressants) produce specific pharmacological benefit 
for the majority of patients with less severe depression” 
[37, p.32].  
Although these meta-analyses are cited in the 
guideline, the context in which they are referenced does 
not provide the reader with a fully accurate understanding 
of their conclusions. Instead, the following statement is 
made in the guideline’s executive summary: “response 
rates in clinical trials typically range from 50-75% of 
patients, with some evidence suggesting greater efficacy 
relative to placebo in individuals with severe depressive 
symptoms as compared to those with mild to moderate 
symptoms” [17, p.31]. Thus, the reader is left with the 
erroneous impression that there is a clear evidence base for 
the use of ADs for mild to moderate depression and that 
ADs work even more effectively for severe depression.   
This is not to suggest that ADs should never be 
prescribed for mild or chronic sub-threshold depression; 
certainly ADs have helped many people. However, for a 
guideline on depression to be useful to clinicians it needs 
to spell out more clearly under what conditions ADs 
should be prescribed for mild episodes of depression and 
for chronic sub-threshold depressive symptoms. Most 
importantly, the risk/benefit issue of prescribing ADs 
merits more detailed attention. For example, the citation of 
a 50-75% response rate gives the impression that half to 
three fourths of patients can expect a clinically meaningful 
benefit of medication, a benefit that would likely be 
perceived as substantial enough to outweigh concerns 
about adverse side effects. What does not get addressed in 
this guideline is the fact that the response rates are often 
based on disease-oriented, not patient-oriented, outcome 
measures and should not be conflated with remission. That 
is, the effect size set by the UK National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) and used in depression trials is 
0.5 or a drug/placebo difference of 3 points on the 
Hamilton Depression Rating Scale [38]. Thus, the 
statistically significant benefit reported in large RCTs is 
best characterized as a disease-oriented outcome measure 
and may not be clinically meaningful or relevant to 
patients.  Guideline readers may not be aware of the way in 
which citing a response rate from large clinical trials can 
inflate the absolute treatment effect [c.f. 3]. Patients have a 
right to be fully informed about the likelihood and type of 
benefit derived from taking a medication. Quoting 
response rates without the appropriate context can obscure 
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important information for both doctors and their patients as 
they weigh the risks and benefits of taking an AD. 
Thus, if a decision tree or hierarchy of interventions is 
not provided, a clear and explicit explanation of possible 
courses of action should be included to help guide the 
clinician in decision-making. This recommendation is 
consistent with the IoM’s requirement that CPGs “should 
be articulated in a standard form detailing precisely what 
the recommended course of action is and under what 
circumstances it should be performed” [34]. 
 
 
Financial Conflict of Interest - 
Challenge 1: Duty to the Group’s 
Membership 
 
Guidelines from specialty groups run the risk of 
favoring new treatments and approaches, especially if their 
use is limited primarily to that specialty or if the group’s 
members played a large role in their development. The 
APA guideline group limited their search of the literature 
to articles published after the year 2000 and the authors 
acknowledge a bias toward newer treatments based on 
their methods. The bias toward “newer is better” is not 
unique to psychiatry, but it is problematic in light of the 
increasing concerns over the iatrogenic harms of SSRIs 
and serotonin-norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs) 
and the evidence of selective reporting of favorable results 
[36,39].  
To address the practice of selectively reporting 
favorable results, guideline developers should review 
unpublished studies. Additionally, they should consider the 
role that publication bias may play (e.g. using funnel plots 
to assess for publication bias) when assessing and rating 
the strength of the evidence. This recommendation is 
congruent with and extends the IoM requirement that 
guideline developers establish “evidence foundations for 
and rating strength of recommendations” [7]. 
 
 
Financial Conflict of Interest - 
Challenge 2: When to Prohibit and 
When to Manage Conflicts [42] 
 
Growing financial relationships between all medical 
subspecialties and industry have prompted congressional 
inquiry, spurred new federal regulations on conflict of 
interest (COI) and provided the rationale behind the  
recently enacted Physicians Payment Sunshine Act [H.R. 
3590,  Section 6002].  During the time period of APA’s 
CPG development, 100% of work group members reported 
commercial ties to the companies that manufacture the 
medications recommended in the guideline and all of the 
members had multiple financial conflicts of interest.  Other 
guidelines have this issue [43,44], with groups such as 
NICE and the Canadian Network for Mood and Anxiety 
Treatments allowing guideline developers to have financial 
conflicts of interest as long as they were disclosed. The 
APA attempted to mitigate the potential for bias by adding 
a review panel that evaluated the guidelines for possible 
industry influence (they concluded there was none). Yet at 
least 2 of the 5 members of the independent panel had 
industry ties they did not report. These financial 
associations, most notably the fact that the chair and the 
majority of the GDG members participated on speaker 
bureaus, raise questions about the objectivity and integrity 
of the guideline. Speakers Bureau participation is usually 
prohibited (e.g. for faculty in medical schools), as it is 
widely recognized to constitute a significant FCOI. The 
pharmaceutical companies refer to individuals who serve 
on Speakers Bureaus as “key opinion leaders” (KOLs), 
because they are seen as essential to the marketing of both 
diseases and drugs. 
Moreover, there is no evidence to support the 
assumption that only current financial associations with 
industry affect behavior and some evidence suggests past 
and/or the promise of future industry relationships may 
exert a “pro-industry habit of thought” [45] or a “partisan 
perspective in the medical literature” [46]. Therefore, we 
recommend a rebuttable presumption of prohibiting 
financial conflicts of interest among authors of practice 
guidelines. In those circumstances where no independent 
individuals with the requisite expertise are available, 
individuals with associations to industry could serve as 
consultants to the GDG, but they would not have decision-
making authority about treatment recommendations [47]. 
Certainly, an independent review panel should have no 
industry ties. In addition, there should be transparency of 
the decision-making process by which an independent 




Conclusion: producing useful and 
trustworthy guidelines 
 
“American medicine is seriously threatened by 
conflicts of interest whose symptoms signal the 
corruption of the medical mission and the 
profession’s ideals.”[48]. 
 
Numerous studies in behavioral ethics and social 
psychology [49-51] have demonstrated that it is part of the 
human condition to have implicit biases - and remain 
blissfully ignorant of them. Hence, it is unrealistic to 
expect the guild of any service industry, on its own, “to 
harness its self-interest and to act according to beneficence 
alone” [52]. Medicine is no different. These suggestions to 
avoid conflicts of interest are not difficult to implement 
[53]. They are feasible and necessary and in light of the 
fact that “various medical interventions are directly 
contributing to the burden of illness” [54], the stakes are 
Cosgrove and Shaughnessy 
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high. Therefore, in order to restore public trust and 
integrity in medicine and ensure unbiased, evidence-based 
practice, it is critical to prohibit certain conflicts and better 
manage others. If these safeguards are not put in place, 
perhaps it is time to call a moratorium on medical specialty 
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